/* Editor Settings: expandtabs and use 4 spaces for indentation * ex: set softtabstop=4 tabstop=8 expandtab shiftwidth=4: * * -*- mode: c, c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ /* * Copyright Likewise Software 2004-2008 * All rights reserved. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at * your option) any later version. * * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License * for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General * Public License along with this program. If not, see * . * * LIKEWISE SOFTWARE MAKES THIS SOFTWARE AVAILABLE UNDER OTHER LICENSING * TERMS AS WELL. IF YOU HAVE ENTERED INTO A SEPARATE LICENSE AGREEMENT * WITH LIKEWISE SOFTWARE, THEN YOU MAY ELECT TO USE THE SOFTWARE UNDER THE * TERMS OF THAT SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT INSTEAD OF THE TERMS OF THE GNU * GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE, NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABOVE NOTICE. IF YOU * HAVE QUESTIONS, OR WISH TO REQUEST A COPY OF THE ALTERNATE LICENSING * TERMS OFFERED BY LIKEWISE SOFTWARE, PLEASE CONTACT LIKEWISE SOFTWARE AT * license@likewisesoftware.com */ /* * Copyright (C) Likewise Software. All rights reserved. * * Module Name: * * makesign.c * * Abstract: * * Likewise Security and Authentication Subsystem (LSASS) * * MakeSignature client wrapper API * * Authors: Krishna Ganugapati (krishnag@likewisesoftware.com) * Marc Guy (mguy@likewisesoftware.com) */ #include "ntlmsrvapi.h" DWORD NtlmServerMakeSignature( IN PNTLM_CONTEXT_HANDLE phContext, IN DWORD dwQop, IN OUT PSecBufferDesc pMessage, IN DWORD MessageSeqNo ) { DWORD dwError = LW_ERROR_SUCCESS; PNTLM_CONTEXT pContext = *phContext; // The following pointers point into pMessage and will not be freed PSecBuffer pToken = NULL; PSecBuffer pData = NULL; PNTLM_SIGNATURE pSignature = NULL; NtlmGetSecBuffers(pMessage, &pToken, &pData, NULL); // Do a full sanity check here if (!pToken || pToken->cbBuffer != NTLM_SIGNATURE_SIZE || !pToken->pvBuffer || !pData || !pData->cbBuffer || !pData->pvBuffer) { dwError = LW_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; BAIL_ON_LSA_ERROR(dwError); } pSignature = (PNTLM_SIGNATURE)pToken->pvBuffer; if (pContext->NegotiatedFlags & NTLM_FLAG_ALWAYS_SIGN) { // Use the dummy signature 0x01000000000000000000000000000000 pSignature = (PNTLM_SIGNATURE)pToken->pvBuffer; pSignature->dwVersion = NTLM_VERSION; pSignature->v1.encrypted.dwCounterValue = 0; pSignature->v1.encrypted.dwCrc32 = 0; pSignature->v1.encrypted.dwMsgSeqNum = 0; } else if (pContext->NegotiatedFlags & NTLM_FLAG_SIGN) { dwError = NtlmInitializeSignature( pContext, pData, pSignature); BAIL_ON_LSA_ERROR(dwError); NtlmFinalizeSignature(pContext, pSignature); } else { dwError = LW_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; BAIL_ON_LSA_ERROR(dwError); } cleanup: return dwError; error: goto cleanup; } DWORD NtlmInitializeSignature( PNTLM_CONTEXT pContext, const SecBuffer* pData, PNTLM_SIGNATURE pSignature ) { DWORD dwError = 0; if (!pContext->pdwSendMsgSeq) { dwError = ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; BAIL_ON_LSA_ERROR(dwError); } pSignature->dwVersion = 1; pSignature->v2.dwMsgSeqNum = *pContext->pdwSendMsgSeq; (*pContext->pdwSendMsgSeq)++; if (pContext->NegotiatedFlags & NTLM_FLAG_NTLM2) { unsigned char tempHmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; HMAC_CTX c; HMAC_CTX_init(&c); HMAC_Init( &c, pContext->SignKey, sizeof(pContext->SignKey), EVP_md5()); HMAC_Update( &c, (PBYTE)&pSignature->v2.dwMsgSeqNum, sizeof(pSignature->v2.dwMsgSeqNum)); HMAC_Update( &c, pData->pvBuffer, pData->cbBuffer); HMAC_Final( &c, tempHmac, NULL); // Copy only the first part of the hmac memcpy(pSignature->v2.encrypted.hmac, tempHmac, sizeof(pSignature->v2.encrypted.hmac)); } else { dwError = NtlmCrc32( pData->pvBuffer, pData->cbBuffer, &pSignature->v1.encrypted.dwCrc32); BAIL_ON_LSA_ERROR(dwError); } cleanup: return dwError; error: goto cleanup; } VOID NtlmFinalizeSignature( PNTLM_CONTEXT pContext, PNTLM_SIGNATURE pSignature ) { if (pContext->NegotiatedFlags & NTLM_FLAG_NTLM2) { // The davenport doc says that the hmac is sealed after being generated // with the signing key. In reality that only happens if the key // exchange flag is set. if (pContext->NegotiatedFlags & NTLM_FLAG_KEY_EXCH) { RC4( pContext->pSealKey, sizeof(pSignature->v2.encrypted), (PBYTE)&pSignature->v2.encrypted, (PBYTE)&pSignature->v2.encrypted); } } else { RC4( pContext->pSealKey, sizeof(pSignature->v1.encrypted), (PBYTE)&pSignature->v1.encrypted, (PBYTE)&pSignature->v1.encrypted); pSignature->v1.encrypted.dwCounterValue = NTLM_COUNTER_VALUE; } }