/* Editor Settings: expandtabs and use 4 spaces for indentation * ex: set softtabstop=4 tabstop=8 expandtab shiftwidth=4: * * -*- mode: c, c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */ /* * Copyright Likewise Software 2004-2008 * All rights reserved. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at * your option) any later version. * * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License * for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General * Public License along with this program. If not, see * . * * LIKEWISE SOFTWARE MAKES THIS SOFTWARE AVAILABLE UNDER OTHER LICENSING * TERMS AS WELL. IF YOU HAVE ENTERED INTO A SEPARATE LICENSE AGREEMENT * WITH LIKEWISE SOFTWARE, THEN YOU MAY ELECT TO USE THE SOFTWARE UNDER THE * TERMS OF THAT SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT INSTEAD OF THE TERMS OF THE GNU * GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE, NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABOVE NOTICE. IF YOU * HAVE QUESTIONS, OR WISH TO REQUEST A COPY OF THE ALTERNATE LICENSING * TERMS OFFERED BY LIKEWISE SOFTWARE, PLEASE CONTACT LIKEWISE SOFTWARE AT * license@likewisesoftware.com */ /* * Copyright (C) Likewise Software. All rights reserved. * * Module Name: * * verifysign.c * * Abstract: * * Likewise Security and Authentication Subsystem (LSASS) * * VerifySignature client wrapper API * * Authors: Krishna Ganugapati (krishnag@likewisesoftware.com) * Marc Guy (mguy@likewisesoftware.com) */ #include "ntlmsrvapi.h" DWORD NtlmServerVerifySignature( IN PNTLM_CONTEXT_HANDLE phContext, IN const SecBufferDesc* pMessage, IN DWORD MessageSeqNo, OUT PDWORD pQop ) { DWORD dwError = LW_ERROR_SUCCESS; PNTLM_CONTEXT pContext = *phContext; // The following pointers point into pMessage and will not be freed const SecBuffer* pToken = NULL; const SecBuffer* pData = NULL; NtlmGetSecBuffers( (PSecBufferDesc)pMessage, (PSecBuffer *)&pToken, (PSecBuffer *)&pData, NULL); // Do a full sanity check here if (!pToken || pToken->cbBuffer != NTLM_SIGNATURE_SIZE || !pToken->pvBuffer || !pData || !pData->pvBuffer) { dwError = LW_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; BAIL_ON_LSA_ERROR(dwError); } dwError = NtlmVerifySignature( pContext, pData, pToken ); BAIL_ON_LSA_ERROR(dwError); cleanup: return dwError; error: goto cleanup; } DWORD NtlmVerifySignature( IN PNTLM_CONTEXT pContext, IN const SecBuffer* pData, IN const SecBuffer* pToken ) { DWORD dwError = LW_ERROR_SUCCESS; DWORD dwCrc32 = 0; NTLM_SIGNATURE signature; if (pToken->cbBuffer != sizeof(signature)) { dwError = ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; BAIL_ON_LSA_ERROR(dwError); } memcpy(&signature, pToken->pvBuffer, sizeof(signature)); if (pContext->NegotiatedFlags & NTLM_FLAG_NTLM2) { unsigned char tempHmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; HMAC_CTX c; if (!(pContext->NegotiatedFlags & NTLM_FLAG_SIGN)) { dwError = LW_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; BAIL_ON_LSA_ERROR(dwError); } HMAC_CTX_init(&c); HMAC_Init( &c, pContext->VerifyKey, sizeof(pContext->VerifyKey), EVP_md5()); HMAC_Update( &c, (PBYTE)&signature.v2.dwMsgSeqNum, sizeof(signature.v2.dwMsgSeqNum)); HMAC_Update( &c, pData->pvBuffer, pData->cbBuffer); HMAC_Final( &c, tempHmac, NULL); // The davenport doc says that the hmac is sealed after being generated // with the signing key. In reality that only happens if the key // exchange flag is set. if (pContext->NegotiatedFlags & NTLM_FLAG_KEY_EXCH) { RC4( pContext->pUnsealKey, sizeof(signature.v2.encrypted.hmac), signature.v2.encrypted.hmac, signature.v2.encrypted.hmac); } if (memcmp(signature.v2.encrypted.hmac, tempHmac, sizeof(signature.v2.encrypted.hmac))) { dwError = ERROR_CRC; BAIL_ON_LSA_ERROR(dwError); } } else { RC4( pContext->pUnsealKey, sizeof(signature.v1.encrypted), (PBYTE)&signature.v1.encrypted, (PBYTE)&signature.v1.encrypted); signature.v1.encrypted.dwCounterValue = 0; if (pContext->NegotiatedFlags & NTLM_FLAG_ALWAYS_SIGN) { // Use the dummy signature 0x01000000000000000000000000000000 dwCrc32 = 0; } else if (pContext->NegotiatedFlags & NTLM_FLAG_SIGN) { // generate a crc for the message dwError = NtlmCrc32(pData->pvBuffer, pData->cbBuffer, &dwCrc32); BAIL_ON_LSA_ERROR(dwError); } else { dwError = LW_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; BAIL_ON_LSA_ERROR(dwError); } if (dwCrc32 != signature.v1.encrypted.dwCrc32) { dwError = ERROR_CRC; BAIL_ON_LSA_ERROR(dwError); } } if (!pContext->pdwRecvMsgSeq) { dwError = ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; BAIL_ON_LSA_ERROR(dwError); } if (*pContext->pdwRecvMsgSeq != signature.v2.dwMsgSeqNum) { dwError = ERROR_REQUEST_OUT_OF_SEQUENCE; BAIL_ON_LSA_ERROR(dwError); } (*pContext->pdwRecvMsgSeq)++; cleanup: return dwError; error: goto cleanup; } VOID NtlmGetSecBuffers( PSecBufferDesc pMessage, PSecBuffer* ppToken, PSecBuffer* ppData, PSecBuffer* ppPadding ) { DWORD dwIndex = 0; PSecBuffer pToken = NULL; PSecBuffer pData = NULL; PSecBuffer pPadding = NULL; for (dwIndex = 0; dwIndex < pMessage->cBuffers; dwIndex++) { if (pMessage->pBuffers[dwIndex].BufferType == SECBUFFER_TOKEN) { if (!pToken) { pToken = &pMessage->pBuffers[dwIndex]; } } else if (pMessage->pBuffers[dwIndex].BufferType == SECBUFFER_DATA) { if (!pData) { pData = &pMessage->pBuffers[dwIndex]; } } else if (pMessage->pBuffers[dwIndex].BufferType == SECBUFFER_PADDING) { if (!pPadding) { pPadding = &pMessage->pBuffers[dwIndex]; } } } if (ppToken) { *ppToken = pToken; } if (ppData) { *ppData = pData; } if (ppPadding) { *ppPadding = pPadding; } }