/* Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. endpoint server for the backupkey interface Copyright (C) Matthieu Patou 2010 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program. If not, see . */ #include "includes.h" #include "rpc_server/dcerpc_server.h" #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_backupkey.h" #include "dsdb/common/util.h" #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h" #include "lib/ldb/include/ldb_errors.h" #include "../lib/util/util_ldb.h" #include "param/param.h" #include "auth/session.h" #include "system/network.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "../lib/tsocket/tsocket.h" #include "../libcli/security/security.h" #define BACKUPKEY_MIN_VERSION 2 #define BACKUPKEY_MAX_VERSION 3 static const unsigned rsa_with_var_num[] = { 1, 2, 840, 113549, 1, 1, 1 }; /* Equivalent to asn1_oid_id_pkcs1_rsaEncryption*/ static const AlgorithmIdentifier _hx509_signature_rsa_with_var_num = { { 7, discard_const_p(unsigned, rsa_with_var_num) }, NULL }; static NTSTATUS set_lsa_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct ldb_context *ldb, const char *name, const DATA_BLOB *secret) { struct ldb_message *msg; struct ldb_result *res; struct ldb_dn *domain_dn; struct ldb_dn *system_dn; struct ldb_val val; int ret; char *name2; struct timeval now = timeval_current(); NTTIME nt_now = timeval_to_nttime(&now); const char *attrs[] = { NULL }; domain_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb); if (!domain_dn) { return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; } msg = ldb_msg_new(mem_ctx); if (msg == NULL) { return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } /* * This function is a lot like dcesrv_lsa_CreateSecret * in the rpc_server/lsa directory * The reason why we duplicate the effort here is that: * * we want to keep the former function static * * we want to avoid the burden of doing LSA calls * when we can just manipulate the secrets directly * * taillor the function to the particular needs of backup protocol */ system_dn = samdb_search_dn(ldb, msg, domain_dn, "(&(objectClass=container)(cn=System))"); if (system_dn == NULL) { talloc_free(msg); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } name2 = talloc_asprintf(msg, "%s Secret", name); if (name2 == NULL) { talloc_free(msg); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } ret = ldb_search(ldb, mem_ctx, &res, system_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "(&(cn=%s)(objectclass=secret))", ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, name2)); if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS || res->count != 0 ) { DEBUG(2, ("Secret %s already exists !\n", name2)); talloc_free(msg); return NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION; } /* * We don't care about previous value as we are * here only if the key didn't exists before */ msg->dn = ldb_dn_copy(mem_ctx, system_dn); if (msg->dn == NULL) { talloc_free(msg); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } if (!ldb_dn_add_child_fmt(msg->dn, "cn=%s", name2)) { talloc_free(msg); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } ret = ldb_msg_add_string(msg, "cn", name2); if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { talloc_free(msg); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } ret = ldb_msg_add_string(msg, "objectClass", "secret"); if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { talloc_free(msg); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } ret = samdb_msg_add_uint64(ldb, mem_ctx, msg, "priorSetTime", nt_now); if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { talloc_free(msg); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } val.data = secret->data; val.length = secret->length; ret = ldb_msg_add_value(msg, "currentValue", &val, NULL); if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { talloc_free(msg); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } ret = samdb_msg_add_uint64(ldb, mem_ctx, msg, "lastSetTime", nt_now); if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { talloc_free(msg); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } /* * create the secret with DSDB_MODIFY_RELAX * otherwise dsdb/samdb/ldb_modules/objectclass.c forbid * the create of LSA secret object */ ret = dsdb_add(ldb, msg, DSDB_MODIFY_RELAX); if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { DEBUG(2,("Failed to create secret record %s: %s\n", ldb_dn_get_linearized(msg->dn), ldb_errstring(ldb))); talloc_free(msg); return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; } talloc_free(msg); return NT_STATUS_OK; } /* This function is pretty much like dcesrv_lsa_QuerySecret */ static NTSTATUS get_lsa_secret(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct ldb_context *ldb, const char *name, DATA_BLOB *secret) { TALLOC_CTX *tmp_mem; struct ldb_result *res; struct ldb_dn *domain_dn; struct ldb_dn *system_dn; const struct ldb_val *val; uint8_t *data; const char *attrs[] = { "currentValue", NULL }; int ret; secret->data = NULL; secret->length = 0; domain_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb); if (!domain_dn) { return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; } tmp_mem = talloc_new(mem_ctx); if (tmp_mem == NULL) { return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } system_dn = samdb_search_dn(ldb, tmp_mem, domain_dn, "(&(objectClass=container)(cn=System))"); if (system_dn == NULL) { talloc_free(tmp_mem); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } ret = ldb_search(ldb, mem_ctx, &res, system_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "(&(cn=%s Secret)(objectclass=secret))", ldb_binary_encode_string(tmp_mem, name)); if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS || res->count == 0) { talloc_free(tmp_mem); /* * Important NOT to use NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND * as this return value is used to detect the case * when we have the secret but without the currentValue * (case RODC) */ return NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND; } if (res->count > 1) { DEBUG(2, ("Secret %s collision\n", name)); talloc_free(tmp_mem); return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_DB_CORRUPTION; } val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(res->msgs[0], "currentValue"); if (val == NULL) { /* * The secret object is here but we don't have the secret value * The most common case is a RODC */ talloc_free(tmp_mem); return NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND; } data = val->data; secret->data = talloc_move(mem_ctx, &data); secret->length = val->length; talloc_free(tmp_mem); return NT_STATUS_OK; } static DATA_BLOB *reverse_and_get_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, BIGNUM *bn) { DATA_BLOB blob; DATA_BLOB *rev = talloc(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB); uint32_t i; blob.length = BN_num_bytes(bn); blob.data = talloc_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, blob.length); if (blob.data == NULL) { return NULL; } BN_bn2bin(bn, blob.data); rev->data = talloc_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, blob.length); if (rev->data == NULL) { return NULL; } for(i=0; i < blob.length; i++) { rev->data[i] = blob.data[blob.length - i -1]; } rev->length = blob.length; talloc_free(blob.data); return rev; } static BIGNUM *reverse_and_get_bignum(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB *blob) { BIGNUM *ret; DATA_BLOB rev; uint32_t i; rev.data = talloc_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, blob->length); if (rev.data == NULL) { return NULL; } for(i=0; i < blob->length; i++) { rev.data[i] = blob->data[blob->length - i -1]; } rev.length = blob->length; ret = BN_bin2bn(rev.data, rev.length, NULL); talloc_free(rev.data); return ret; } static NTSTATUS get_pk_from_raw_keypair_params(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, struct bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair *keypair, hx509_private_key *pk) { hx509_context hctx; RSA *rsa; struct hx509_private_key_ops *ops; hx509_context_init(&hctx); ops = hx509_find_private_alg(&_hx509_signature_rsa_with_var_num.algorithm); if (ops == NULL) { DEBUG(2, ("Not supported algorithm\n")); return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; } if (hx509_private_key_init(pk, ops, NULL) != 0) { hx509_context_free(&hctx); return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; } rsa = RSA_new(); if (rsa ==NULL) { hx509_context_free(&hctx); return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; } rsa->n = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->modulus)); if (rsa->n == NULL) { RSA_free(rsa); hx509_context_free(&hctx); return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; } rsa->d = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->private_exponent)); if (rsa->d == NULL) { RSA_free(rsa); hx509_context_free(&hctx); return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; } rsa->p = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->prime1)); if (rsa->p == NULL) { RSA_free(rsa); hx509_context_free(&hctx); return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; } rsa->q = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->prime2)); if (rsa->q == NULL) { RSA_free(rsa); hx509_context_free(&hctx); return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; } rsa->dmp1 = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->exponent1)); if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL) { RSA_free(rsa); hx509_context_free(&hctx); return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; } rsa->dmq1 = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->exponent2)); if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL) { RSA_free(rsa); hx509_context_free(&hctx); return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; } rsa->iqmp = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->coefficient)); if (rsa->iqmp == NULL) { RSA_free(rsa); hx509_context_free(&hctx); return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; } rsa->e = reverse_and_get_bignum(ctx, &(keypair->public_exponent)); if (rsa->e == NULL) { RSA_free(rsa); hx509_context_free(&hctx); return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; } hx509_private_key_assign_rsa(*pk, rsa); hx509_context_free(&hctx); return NT_STATUS_OK; } static WERROR get_and_verify_access_check(TALLOC_CTX *sub_ctx, uint32_t version, uint8_t *key_and_iv, uint8_t *access_check, uint32_t access_check_len, struct dom_sid **access_sid) { heim_octet_string iv; heim_octet_string access_check_os; hx509_crypto crypto; DATA_BLOB blob_us; uint32_t key_len; uint32_t iv_len; int res; enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; hx509_context hctx; /* This one should not be freed */ const AlgorithmIdentifier *alg; *access_sid = NULL; switch (version) { case 2: key_len = 24; iv_len = 8; alg = hx509_crypto_des_rsdi_ede3_cbc(); break; case 3: key_len = 32; iv_len = 16; alg =hx509_crypto_aes256_cbc(); break; default: return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } hx509_context_init(&hctx); res = hx509_crypto_init(hctx, NULL, &(alg->algorithm), &crypto); hx509_context_free(&hctx); if (res != 0) { return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } res = hx509_crypto_set_key_data(crypto, key_and_iv, key_len); iv.data = talloc_memdup(sub_ctx, key_len + key_and_iv, iv_len); iv.length = iv_len; if (res != 0) { hx509_crypto_destroy(crypto); return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } hx509_crypto_set_padding(crypto, HX509_CRYPTO_PADDING_NONE); res = hx509_crypto_decrypt(crypto, access_check, access_check_len, &iv, &access_check_os); if (res != 0) { hx509_crypto_destroy(crypto); return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } blob_us.data = access_check_os.data; blob_us.length = access_check_os.length; hx509_crypto_destroy(crypto); if (version == 2) { uint32_t hash_size = 20; uint8_t hash[hash_size]; struct sha sctx; struct bkrp_access_check_v2 uncrypted_accesscheckv2; ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob_us, sub_ctx, &uncrypted_accesscheckv2, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_access_check_v2); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { /* Unable to unmarshall */ der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os); return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } if (uncrypted_accesscheckv2.magic != 0x1) { /* wrong magic */ der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os); return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } SHA1_Init(&sctx); SHA1_Update(&sctx, blob_us.data, blob_us.length - hash_size); SHA1_Final(hash, &sctx); der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os); /* * We free it after the sha1 calculation because blob.data * point to the same area */ if (memcmp(hash, uncrypted_accesscheckv2.hash, hash_size) != 0) { DEBUG(2, ("Wrong hash value in the access check in backup key remote protocol\n")); return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } *access_sid = dom_sid_dup(sub_ctx, &(uncrypted_accesscheckv2.sid)); if (*access_sid == NULL) { return WERR_NOMEM; } return WERR_OK; } if (version == 3) { uint32_t hash_size = 64; uint8_t hash[hash_size]; struct hc_sha512state sctx; struct bkrp_access_check_v3 uncrypted_accesscheckv3; ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob_us, sub_ctx, &uncrypted_accesscheckv3, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_access_check_v3); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { /* Unable to unmarshall */ der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os); return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } if (uncrypted_accesscheckv3.magic != 0x1) { /* wrong magic */ der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os); return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } SHA512_Init(&sctx); SHA512_Update(&sctx, blob_us.data, blob_us.length - hash_size); SHA512_Final(hash, &sctx); der_free_octet_string(&access_check_os); /* * We free it after the sha1 calculation because blob.data * point to the same area */ if (memcmp(hash, uncrypted_accesscheckv3.hash, hash_size) != 0) { DEBUG(2, ("Wrong hash value in the access check in backup key remote protocol\n")); return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } *access_sid = dom_sid_dup(sub_ctx, &(uncrypted_accesscheckv3.sid)); if (*access_sid == NULL) { return WERR_NOMEM; } return WERR_OK; } /* Never reached normally as we filtered at the switch / case level */ return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } static WERROR bkrp_do_uncrypt_client_wrap_key(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct bkrp_BackupKey *r, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx) { struct bkrp_client_side_wrapped uncrypt_request; DATA_BLOB blob; enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; char *guid_string; char *cert_secret_name; DATA_BLOB secret; DATA_BLOB *uncrypted; NTSTATUS status; blob.data = r->in.data_in; blob.length = r->in.data_in_len; if (r->in.data_in_len == 0 || r->in.data_in == NULL) { return WERR_INVALID_PARAM; } ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &uncrypt_request, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_client_side_wrapped); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { return WERR_INVALID_PARAM; } if (uncrypt_request.version < BACKUPKEY_MIN_VERSION) { return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER; } if (uncrypt_request.version > BACKUPKEY_MAX_VERSION) { return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER; } guid_string = GUID_string(mem_ctx, &uncrypt_request.guid); if (guid_string == NULL) { return WERR_NOMEM; } cert_secret_name = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "BCKUPKEY_%s", guid_string); if (cert_secret_name == NULL) { return WERR_NOMEM; } status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx, ldb_ctx, cert_secret_name, &secret); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { DEBUG(10, ("Error while fetching secret %s\n", cert_secret_name)); if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND)) { /* we do not have the real secret attribute */ return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER; } else { return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; } } if (secret.length != 0) { hx509_context hctx; struct bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair keypair; hx509_private_key pk; uint32_t i, res; struct dom_sid *access_sid = NULL; heim_octet_string reversed_secret; heim_octet_string uncrypted_secret; AlgorithmIdentifier alg; struct dom_sid *caller_sid; DATA_BLOB blob_us; WERROR werr; ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&secret, mem_ctx, &keypair, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { DEBUG(2, ("Unable to parse the ndr encoded cert in key %s\n", cert_secret_name)); return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; } status = get_pk_from_raw_keypair_params(mem_ctx, &keypair, &pk); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } reversed_secret.data = talloc_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret_len); if (reversed_secret.data == NULL) { hx509_private_key_free(&pk); return WERR_NOMEM; } /* The secret has to be reversed ... */ for(i=0; i< uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret_len; i++) { uint8_t *reversed = (uint8_t *)reversed_secret.data; uint8_t *uncrypt = uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret; reversed[i] = uncrypt[uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret_len - 1 - i]; } reversed_secret.length = uncrypt_request.encrypted_secret_len; /* * Let's try to decrypt the secret now that * we have the private key ... */ hx509_context_init(&hctx); res = hx509_private_key_private_decrypt(hctx, &reversed_secret, &alg.algorithm, pk, &uncrypted_secret); hx509_context_free(&hctx); hx509_private_key_free(&pk); if (res != 0) { /* We are not able to decrypt the secret, looks like something is wrong */ return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } blob_us.data = uncrypted_secret.data; blob_us.length = uncrypted_secret.length; if (uncrypt_request.version == 2) { struct bkrp_encrypted_secret_v2 uncrypted_secretv2; ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob_us, mem_ctx, &uncrypted_secretv2, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_encrypted_secret_v2); der_free_octet_string(&uncrypted_secret); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { /* Unable to unmarshall */ return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } if (uncrypted_secretv2.magic != 0x20) { /* wrong magic */ return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } werr = get_and_verify_access_check(mem_ctx, 2, uncrypted_secretv2.payload_key, uncrypt_request.access_check, uncrypt_request.access_check_len, &access_sid); if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) { return werr; } uncrypted = talloc(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB); if (uncrypted == NULL) { return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } uncrypted->data = uncrypted_secretv2.secret; uncrypted->length = uncrypted_secretv2.secret_len; } if (uncrypt_request.version == 3) { struct bkrp_encrypted_secret_v3 uncrypted_secretv3; ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob_us, mem_ctx, &uncrypted_secretv3, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_encrypted_secret_v3); der_free_octet_string(&uncrypted_secret); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { /* Unable to unmarshall */ return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } if (uncrypted_secretv3.magic1 != 0x30 || uncrypted_secretv3.magic2 != 0x6610 || uncrypted_secretv3.magic3 != 0x800e) { /* wrong magic */ return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } werr = get_and_verify_access_check(mem_ctx, 3, uncrypted_secretv3.payload_key, uncrypt_request.access_check, uncrypt_request.access_check_len, &access_sid); if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) { return werr; } uncrypted = talloc(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB); if (uncrypted == NULL) { return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } uncrypted->data = uncrypted_secretv3.secret; uncrypted->length = uncrypted_secretv3.secret_len; } caller_sid = &dce_call->conn->auth_state.session_info->security_token->sids[PRIMARY_USER_SID_INDEX]; if (!dom_sid_equal(caller_sid, access_sid)) { talloc_free(uncrypted); return WERR_INVALID_ACCESS; } /* * Yeah if we are here all looks pretty good: * - hash is ok * - user sid is the same as the one in access check * - we were able to decrypt the whole stuff */ } if (uncrypted->data == NULL) { return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } /* There is a magic value a the beginning of the data * we can use an adhoc structure but as the * parent structure is just an array of bytes it a lot of work * work just prepending 4 bytes */ *(r->out.data_out) = talloc_zero_array(mem_ctx, uint8_t, uncrypted->length + 4); W_ERROR_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(*(r->out.data_out)); memcpy(4+*(r->out.data_out), uncrypted->data, uncrypted->length); *(r->out.data_out_len) = uncrypted->length + 4; return WERR_OK; } static WERROR create_heimdal_rsa_key(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, hx509_context *hctx, hx509_private_key *pk, RSA **_rsa) { BIGNUM *pub_expo; RSA *rsa; int ret; uint8_t *p0, *p; size_t len; int bits = 2048; *_rsa = NULL; pub_expo = BN_new(); if(pub_expo == NULL) { return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } /* set the public expo to 65537 like everyone */ BN_set_word(pub_expo, 0x10001); rsa = RSA_new(); if(rsa == NULL) { BN_free(pub_expo); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ret = RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, pub_expo, NULL); if(ret != 1) { RSA_free(rsa); BN_free(pub_expo); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } BN_free(pub_expo); len = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(rsa, NULL); if (len < 1) { RSA_free(rsa); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } p0 = p = talloc_array(ctx, uint8_t, len); if (p == NULL) { RSA_free(rsa); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } len = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(rsa, &p); if (len < 1) { RSA_free(rsa); talloc_free(p0); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } /* * To dump the key we can use : * rk_dumpdata("h5lkey", p0, len); */ ret = hx509_parse_private_key(*hctx, &_hx509_signature_rsa_with_var_num , p0, len, HX509_KEY_FORMAT_DER, pk); memset(p0, 0, len); talloc_free(p0); if (ret !=0) { RSA_free(rsa); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } *_rsa = rsa; return WERR_OK; } static WERROR self_sign_cert(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, hx509_context *hctx, hx509_request *req, time_t lifetime, hx509_private_key *private_key, hx509_cert *cert, DATA_BLOB *guidblob) { SubjectPublicKeyInfo spki; hx509_name subject = NULL; hx509_ca_tbs tbs; struct heim_bit_string uniqueid; int ret; uniqueid.data = talloc_memdup(ctx, guidblob->data, guidblob->length); /* uniqueid is a bit string in which each byte represent 1 bit (1 or 0) * so as 1 byte is 8 bits we need to provision 8 times more space as in the * blob */ uniqueid.length = 8 * guidblob->length; memset(&spki, 0, sizeof(spki)); ret = hx509_request_get_name(*hctx, *req, &subject); if (ret !=0) { talloc_free(uniqueid.data); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ret = hx509_request_get_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(*hctx, *req, &spki); if (ret !=0) { talloc_free(uniqueid.data); hx509_name_free(&subject); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ret = hx509_ca_tbs_init(*hctx, &tbs); if (ret !=0) { talloc_free(uniqueid.data); hx509_name_free(&subject); free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_spki(*hctx, tbs, &spki); if (ret !=0) { talloc_free(uniqueid.data); hx509_name_free(&subject); free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_subject(*hctx, tbs, subject); if (ret !=0) { talloc_free(uniqueid.data); hx509_name_free(&subject); free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki); hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_ca(*hctx, tbs, 1); if (ret !=0) { talloc_free(uniqueid.data); hx509_name_free(&subject); free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki); hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_notAfter_lifetime(*hctx, tbs, lifetime); if (ret !=0) { talloc_free(uniqueid.data); hx509_name_free(&subject); free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki); hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ret = hx509_ca_tbs_set_unique(*hctx, tbs, &uniqueid, &uniqueid); if (ret !=0) { talloc_free(uniqueid.data); hx509_name_free(&subject); free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki); hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ret = hx509_ca_sign_self(*hctx, tbs, *private_key, cert); if (ret !=0) { talloc_free(uniqueid.data); hx509_name_free(&subject); free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki); hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } hx509_name_free(&subject); free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&spki); hx509_ca_tbs_free(&tbs); return WERR_OK; } static WERROR create_req(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, hx509_context *hctx, hx509_request *req, hx509_private_key *signer,RSA **rsa, const char *dn) { int ret; SubjectPublicKeyInfo key; hx509_name name; WERROR w_err; w_err = create_heimdal_rsa_key(ctx, hctx, signer, rsa); if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(w_err)) { return w_err; } hx509_request_init(*hctx, req); ret = hx509_parse_name(*hctx, dn, &name); if (ret != 0) { RSA_free(*rsa); hx509_private_key_free(signer); hx509_request_free(req); hx509_name_free(&name); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ret = hx509_request_set_name(*hctx, *req, name); if (ret != 0) { RSA_free(*rsa); hx509_private_key_free(signer); hx509_request_free(req); hx509_name_free(&name); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } hx509_name_free(&name); ret = hx509_private_key2SPKI(*hctx, *signer, &key); if (ret != 0) { RSA_free(*rsa); hx509_private_key_free(signer); hx509_request_free(req); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ret = hx509_request_set_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(*hctx, *req, &key); if (ret != 0) { RSA_free(*rsa); hx509_private_key_free(signer); free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&key); hx509_request_free(req); return WERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } free_SubjectPublicKeyInfo(&key); return WERR_OK; } /* Return an error when we fail to generate a certificate */ static WERROR generate_bkrp_cert(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx, const char *dn) { heim_octet_string data; WERROR w_err; RSA *rsa; hx509_context hctx; hx509_private_key pk; hx509_request req; hx509_cert cert; DATA_BLOB blob; DATA_BLOB blobkeypair; DATA_BLOB *tmp; int ret; bool ok = true; struct GUID guid = GUID_random(); NTSTATUS status; char *secret_name; struct bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair keypair; enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; uint32_t nb_days_validity = 365; DEBUG(6, ("Trying to generate a certificate\n")); hx509_context_init(&hctx); w_err = create_req(ctx, &hctx, &req, &pk, &rsa, dn); if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(w_err)) { hx509_context_free(&hctx); return w_err; } status = GUID_to_ndr_blob(&guid, ctx, &blob); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { hx509_context_free(&hctx); hx509_private_key_free(&pk); RSA_free(rsa); return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } w_err = self_sign_cert(ctx, &hctx, &req, nb_days_validity, &pk, &cert, &blob); if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(w_err)) { hx509_private_key_free(&pk); hx509_context_free(&hctx); return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } ret = hx509_cert_binary(hctx, cert, &data); if (ret !=0) { hx509_cert_free(cert); hx509_private_key_free(&pk); hx509_context_free(&hctx); return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } keypair.cert.data = talloc_memdup(ctx, data.data, data.length); keypair.cert.length = data.length; /* * Heimdal's bignum are big endian and the * structure expect it to be in little endian * so we reverse the buffer to make it work */ tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx, rsa->e); if (tmp == NULL) { ok = false; } else { keypair.public_exponent = *tmp; SMB_ASSERT(tmp->length <= 4); /* * The value is now in little endian but if can happen that the length is * less than 4 bytes. * So if we have less than 4 bytes we pad with zeros so that it correctly * fit into the structure. */ if (tmp->length < 4) { /* * We need the expo to fit 4 bytes */ keypair.public_exponent.data = talloc_zero_array(ctx, uint8_t, 4); memcpy(keypair.public_exponent.data, tmp->data, tmp->length); keypair.public_exponent.length = 4; } } tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->d); if (tmp == NULL) { ok = false; } else { keypair.private_exponent = *tmp; } tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->n); if (tmp == NULL) { ok = false; } else { keypair.modulus = *tmp; } tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->p); if (tmp == NULL) { ok = false; } else { keypair.prime1 = *tmp; } tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->q); if (tmp == NULL) { ok = false; } else { keypair.prime2 = *tmp; } tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->dmp1); if (tmp == NULL) { ok = false; } else { keypair.exponent1 = *tmp; } tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->dmq1); if (tmp == NULL) { ok = false; } else { keypair.exponent2 = *tmp; } tmp = reverse_and_get_blob(ctx,rsa->iqmp); if (tmp == NULL) { ok = false; } else { keypair.coefficient = *tmp; } /* One of the keypair allocation was wrong */ if (ok == false) { der_free_octet_string(&data); hx509_cert_free(cert); hx509_private_key_free(&pk); hx509_context_free(&hctx); RSA_free(rsa); return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } keypair.certificate_len = keypair.cert.length; ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob(&blobkeypair, ctx, &keypair, (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { der_free_octet_string(&data); hx509_cert_free(cert); hx509_private_key_free(&pk); hx509_context_free(&hctx); RSA_free(rsa); return WERR_INVALID_DATA; } secret_name = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "BCKUPKEY_%s", GUID_string(ctx, &guid)); if (secret_name == NULL) { der_free_octet_string(&data); hx509_cert_free(cert); hx509_private_key_free(&pk); hx509_context_free(&hctx); RSA_free(rsa); return WERR_OUTOFMEMORY; } status = set_lsa_secret(ctx, ldb_ctx, secret_name, &blobkeypair); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { DEBUG(2, ("Failed to save the secret %s\n", secret_name)); } talloc_free(secret_name); GUID_to_ndr_blob(&guid, ctx, &blob); status = set_lsa_secret(ctx, ldb_ctx, "BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED", &blob); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { DEBUG(2, ("Failed to save the secret BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED\n")); } der_free_octet_string(&data); hx509_cert_free(cert); hx509_private_key_free(&pk); hx509_context_free(&hctx); RSA_free(rsa); return WERR_OK; } static WERROR bkrp_do_retreive_client_wrap_key(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct bkrp_BackupKey *r ,struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx) { struct GUID guid; char *guid_string; DATA_BLOB secret; enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; NTSTATUS status; /* * here we basicaly need to return our certificate * search for lsa secret BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED first */ status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx, ldb_ctx, "BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED", &secret); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { DEBUG(10, ("Error while fetching secret BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED\n")); if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND)) { /* Ok we can be in this case if there was no certs */ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx; char *dn = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "CN=%s.%s", lpcfg_netbios_name(lp_ctx), lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx)); WERROR werr = generate_bkrp_cert(mem_ctx, dce_call, ldb_ctx, dn); if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) { return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER; } status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx, ldb_ctx, "BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED", &secret); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { /* Ok we really don't manage to get this certs ...*/ DEBUG(2, ("Unable to locate BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED after cert generation\n")); return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; } } else { /* In theory we should NEVER reach this point as it should only appear in a rodc server */ /* we do not have the real secret attribute */ return WERR_INVALID_PARAMETER; } } if (secret.length != 0) { char *cert_secret_name; status = GUID_from_ndr_blob(&secret, &guid); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; } guid_string = GUID_string(mem_ctx, &guid); if (guid_string == NULL) { /* We return file not found because the client * expect this error */ return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; } cert_secret_name = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "BCKUPKEY_%s", guid_string); status = get_lsa_secret(mem_ctx, ldb_ctx, cert_secret_name, &secret); if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; } if (secret.length != 0) { struct bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair keypair; ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&secret, mem_ctx, &keypair, (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_bkrp_exported_RSA_key_pair); if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; } *(r->out.data_out_len) = keypair.cert.length; *(r->out.data_out) = talloc_memdup(mem_ctx, keypair.cert.data, keypair.cert.length); W_ERROR_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(*(r->out.data_out)); return WERR_OK; } else { DEBUG(10, ("No or broken secret called %s\n", cert_secret_name)); return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; } } else { DEBUG(10, ("No secret BCKUPKEY_PREFERRED\n")); return WERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND; } return WERR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } static WERROR dcesrv_bkrp_BackupKey(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct bkrp_BackupKey *r) { WERROR error = WERR_INVALID_PARAM; struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx; bool is_rodc; const char *addr = "unknown"; /* At which level we start to add more debug of what is done in the protocol */ const int debuglevel = 4; if (DEBUGLVL(debuglevel)) { const struct tsocket_address *remote_address; remote_address = dcesrv_connection_get_remote_address(dce_call->conn); if (tsocket_address_is_inet(remote_address, "ip")) { addr = tsocket_address_inet_addr_string(remote_address, mem_ctx); W_ERROR_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(addr); } } if (lpcfg_server_role(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx) != ROLE_ACTIVE_DIRECTORY_DC) { return WERR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } if (!dce_call->conn->auth_state.auth_info || dce_call->conn->auth_state.auth_info->auth_level != DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_PRIVACY) { DCESRV_FAULT(DCERPC_FAULT_ACCESS_DENIED); } ldb_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, dce_call->event_ctx, dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), 0); if (samdb_rodc(ldb_ctx, &is_rodc) != LDB_SUCCESS) { talloc_unlink(mem_ctx, ldb_ctx); return WERR_INVALID_PARAM; } if (!is_rodc) { if(strncasecmp(GUID_string(mem_ctx, r->in.guidActionAgent), BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID, strlen(BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID)) == 0) { DEBUG(debuglevel, ("Client %s requested to decrypt a client side wrapped secret\n", addr)); error = bkrp_do_uncrypt_client_wrap_key(dce_call, mem_ctx, r, ldb_ctx); } if (strncasecmp(GUID_string(mem_ctx, r->in.guidActionAgent), BACKUPKEY_RETRIEVE_BACKUP_KEY_GUID, strlen(BACKUPKEY_RETRIEVE_BACKUP_KEY_GUID)) == 0) { DEBUG(debuglevel, ("Client %s requested certificate for client wrapped secret\n", addr)); error = bkrp_do_retreive_client_wrap_key(dce_call, mem_ctx, r, ldb_ctx); } } /*else: I am a RODC so I don't handle backup key protocol */ talloc_unlink(mem_ctx, ldb_ctx); return error; } /* include the generated boilerplate */ #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_backupkey_s.c"